The dead sea: collection of tweets, articles, maps and figures on the migration crisis in the Mediterranean

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Migration and revolution*

*This article (pdf) is published in the latest issue of FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW (#39) on North Africa and Displacement. Translation in Français & العربية

By  Hein de Haas (IMI, Oxford) and Nando Sigona (RSC, Oxford)

The Arab Spring has not radically transformed migration patterns in the  Mediterranean, and the label ‘migration crisis’ does not do justice to the  composite and stratified reality.

From the outbreak of the  popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, European media and  politicians were preoccupied with the prospect of ‘tidal waves’ of North  Africans reaching Europe. These sensational predictions lacked any scientific  basis so it should come as no surprise that they have not come true.

Nonetheless, migration  in its various forms has played a key part in the uprisings that spread across these  regions. The columns of vehicles escaping from cities and villages under siege  in Libya, the migrant workers awaiting repatriation in the holding centres in  Egypt and Tunisia, the boats crammed with Tunisians and sub-Saharan Africans crossing  the Mediterranean Sea and landing on the island of Lampedusa, and the numerous  Egyptian émigrés and university students returning to Cairo to join the  protests in Tahrir Square are a few examples of the ways in which human  mobility has intersected the events in North Africa.

Recent migration events  are not simply a side effect of the revolutions. The possible links between  declining opportunities for migration from North Africa to the EU (due to the  economic crisis and intensified border controls) and the exclusion and  discontent of disenfranchised youth on the one hand, and the protests on the  streets of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Morocco on the other, deserve  closer consideration.

As a starting point it seems  useful to distinguish between the uprisings themselves, and the subsequent transition  and consolidation of new political regimes. This allows a clearer overview of  mobility patterns,  the various ways  migration and forced displacement have intersected with the popular uprisings  over time, and the models of engagement adopted in this rapidly changing  political situation by international agencies that otherwise would be lost in  the generic label ‘Arab Spring’.

From the northern shores

“In 2011, the EU missed a historic opportunity to  demonstrate its commitment to the foundations it is built on. It is as if we’d  said to them: ‘It is wonderful that you make a revolution and want to embrace  democracy but, by all means [possible], stay where you are because we have an  economic crisis to deal with here.’” (Cecilia Malmström, EU Home Affairs Commissioner)

This quote from a  public lecture at Harvard University in April 2012 reflects a remarkably candid  assessment of the ambiguity of response by the EU and its Member States to the  migration flows associated with the political instability and economic  insecurity in North Africa and the Middle East. The array of documents, policy statements and position  papers issued over the last year by EU institutions highlights an anxiety about  the exodus of North Africans towards the northern shores of the Mediterranean  Sea. While this exodus never happened, the powerful image of an ‘invasion’ –  with the Italian island of Lampedusa acquiring an iconic status – has certainly  permeated public perceptions and the policy responses of EU Member States.

The EU’s response to this  conflict-related migration in North Africa has also demonstrated the tension  between internal and external dimensions of migration governance. The EU’s  Global Approach to Migration and Mobility paper (GAMM)1 of November 2011 tried to  reframe the EU’s approach around four “equally important” pillars: facilitating  regular migration and mobility; preventing and reducing irregular migration and  trafficking; maximising development impact; and promoting international  protection and “enhancing the external dimension of asylum policy”.

While this is a step in  the right direction by apparently shifting away from a unilateral bias on  security issues, the GAMM still remains locked into the false and misleading  dichotomy of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migration (even though with a softer tone).  The centrality of migration enforcement and control is still paramount and the strengthened  role of Frontex2,  which saw its operational budget rocket from €6.3 million in 2005 to nearly €42  million in 2007 and topping €87 million by 2010, symbolises this priority. The  reality of the deaths at sea of an estimated 2,000 migrants in 2011 alone, at a time when the Mediterranean Sea had become one of the most  militarised and heavily patrolled areas of the globe, is a stark reminder of  the gap between EU rhetoric and actual practice on development and human  rights.

The social and political  unrest and the popular push towards more democratic governance in North Africa  have upset the cosy relationship and collaboration on migration issues between  European and North African governments. In the years preceding the revolutions,  the EU and its North African counterparts thought that the problem of the crossing  of the external borders of Europe by ‘undesirables’ was, if not solved, at  least beginning to be overcome. In addition to increasingly restrictive  immigration regimes, the EU externalised border controls to North African  countries through initiatives such as the bilateral agreements between the  former Libyan regime and Italy, or Tunisia and France, or Morocco and Spain.  Rather than stopping migration, this has increased the irregular character of  migration and has led to a geographical diversification of overland and  maritime migration routes in and from Africa. This has made migration more  costly and risky for migrants, and increased their vulnerability to  exploitation and suffering. EU policy makers seem rarely to consider these side  effects.

From  the southern shores

The hundreds of  thousands of sub-Saharan and other migrant workers stranded in Libya during the  civil war who sought refuge across the Egyptian and Tunisian borders suddenly  exposed the scale of intra-African migration to the global public. Overall,  migrant workers from more than 120 countries were displaced during the  conflict.

Eurocentric accounts of the Arab Spring almost  completely ignored the profound impact of the Arab Spring on countries of  origin. This pertains not only to the possible role of returnees in the recent political  violence in countries like Mali but also to the fact that many families in  extremely poor countries are now deprived of vital remittance income since  migrant workers returned home from Libya. In many ways, returnee migrants moved  from one situation of insecurity to another.

Many displaced people were migrant workers who had lived  in Libya for years. In the wake of the conflict most of them have tried to  return home, discrediting the idea that the Arab Spring would cause a mass  exodus to Europe.

However, the most vulnerable group consisted of  migrants and refugees who were not able to return because it was too dangerous  and/or because they lacked the money and contacts to facilitate their flight.  They have become trapped in a situation which the migration researcher Jørgen  Carling has aptly described as “involuntary immobility”. Others did not necessarily aspire to return, as they  had fled insecurity, persecution and deprivation in their own countries, and had  often been living in North Africa and the Middle East for many years or even decades.  These include sub-Saharan and Tuareg migrants in Libya; Iraqis, Palestinians  and Somalis in Syria; and Sudanese and Somalis in Egypt. Political instability,  economic crisis, increasing costs of living and unemployment, and the increase of  insecurity (due to reduced policing) have made these groups more vulnerable  than they were already.

Mass flight has been largely confined to Libya and  there has been no major increase of emigration from other North African  countries. The increase in Tunisian emigration was facilitated by reduced policing  during the revolution but stood in a long-standing tradition of irregular boat  migration to Europe that has existed since southern European countries  introduced visas for North Africans around 1991.

Emigration and  revolution

It is rather unlikely that the revolutions will  drastically change long-term migration patterns. The same processes that have  created the conditions for the revolutions are also conducive to emigration,  and the two phenomena may reinforce each other. In the region, a new generation  has grown up, better educated, with wider aspirations and more aware of opportunities  elsewhere and injustices at home than any previous generation, but at the same  time feeling rejected and angry due to high unemployment, corruption,  inequality and political repression.

The coming of age of a new, wired and aware generation  of angry young men and women has increased both the emigration and the revolutionary  potential of Arab societies. Even under the most optimistic scenarios, the idea  that emigration will stop is as unlikely as the idea of a mass exodus towards  Europe. Certainly, a populous and deprived country like Egypt seems to have a  significant emigration potential for years to come. However, whether these  migrants will go to Europe or elsewhere primarily depends on future economic  growth in Europe and elsewhere. At the same time, it is likely that the Libyan  oil economy will continue to rely on migrant labour, and Egyptian and  sub-Saharan migrants have in fact started to return there.

For political elites in the region, migration has  fulfilled an important role as a safety valve, since the opportunity to migrateoverseas relieved unemployment,  discontent and internal political pressures for reform. This lack of migration  opportunities may perhaps have turned the attention and anger inwards, and  tipped the balance in favour of revolutionary forces. Besides, political exiles  and emigrants played an important role in supporting the revolutions, certainly  in Tunisia and Egypt.

What will be the impact of political reforms and possibly  more democratic modes of governance on migration and migration policy? Some observers  argue that the more conservative, religiously inspired nature of current and  future governments may possibly increase migration aspirations among secular  elites, minorities and women, whose rights might possibly be impinged upon.

On the other hand, possible increases in respect for  human rights for their own citizens may also push North African societies to  become more reflective and self-critical towards xenophobia and violations of  the rights of migrants and refugees, and make their governments less willing to  collaborate with the security-focused immigration policies of European  countries.

Hein de Haas hein.dehaas@qeh.ox.ac.uk is Co-Director of the International Migration Institute www.imi.ox.ac.uk  Nando Sigona nando.sigona@qeh.ox.ac.uk is  a Senior Research Officer at the Refugee Studies Centre www.rsc.ox.ac.uk.

A missed opportunity: the EU’s response to the Arab Spring

In 2011, the EU missed a historic opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the foundations it is built on. It is as if we’d said to them “It is wonderful that you make a revolution and want to embrace democracy but, by all means, stay where you are because we have an economic crisis to deal with here” (Cecilia Malmstrom, EU Home Affairs Commissioner)

The quote comes from a lecture EU Commissioner Malstrom gave today at the Center for European Studies on the EU’s and EU member states’ responses to the Arab Spring, addressing in particular the challanges of building a EU migration and asylum policy. To read the full text of the lecture is available here. The words of the Commissioner echoe some of the concerns I had pointed to in a recent blog post. I am currently working with Hein de Haas to a joint commentary piece to be published on the forthcoming issue of Forced Migration Review on  North Africa and Displacement 2011-2012 in which we further develop our understanding of the complex relationship between human mobility, forced displacement and political uprisings in the MENA region.

Human mobility and the Arab Spring(s)

Audio recordings of the international symposium ‘The Arab Spring and beyond: Human mobility, forced migration and international responses’ are on now available at Forced Migration Online.

By Nando Sigona

What follows are brief reflections inspired by the international symposium ‘The Arab Spring and beyond: Human mobility, forced migration and international responses’ that took place at the Oxford Department of International Development on 20th March. The event was organised by the Refugee Studies Centre, the International Migration Institute and the Oxford Diasporas Programme with the participation of international scholars, practitioners and policy makers (see also Hein de Haas’ blog post on the symposium).

The geographical focus on the Levant and North Africa enabled participants to discuss migration in two crucial and distinct stages: in the context, and in relation to the transition and consolidation of new political regimes; and during the uprisings. It also offered the opportunity to discuss issues around the circulation of people, ideas, models of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation and international engagement between these regions.

The first panel, ‘Revolution, asylum and mobility’, addressed the impact of the Arab Spring on existing migration patterns in the regions and its capacity to generate new ones. The presentations by Clare Oxby (University of Bern) and Phil Marfleet (University of East London), and a written contribution by Hassen Boubakri (University of Sousse) questioned assumptions on the capacity of uprisings to radically transform existing migration patterns in the short term, and emphasised respectively the differential impact on migrants of the ongoing political transition according to ethnic and cultural positionalities (Oxby); the longue durée of processes of neoliberal land reform in Egypt initiated under Mubarak that, by producing the ‘disembedment’ of peasant youth from land, created the premises for some of the migration flows we are witnessing now (Marfleet); and the need to look not only to the impact of the Arab Spring on migration, but also to the impact of migration control on the Arab Spring (Boubakri). Boubakri notes in particular that at the end of 2010, the EU and its Maghreb counterparts ‘could estimate that the problem of crossing the external borders of Europe by “undesirables” was, if not solved, beginning to be mastered’.

Boubakri’s observation alerts us that the proximity of the Arab Spring to the EU goes beyond the consideration of the geographical distance between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea (just 14Km between Spain and Morocco!) and , which makes North Africa part of the areas covered by the EU neighbourhood policy, pointing to the symbiotic nature of the economic, social and political relationship between the peoples and institutions in the Mediterranean Basin.

A further aspect to consider is that, in addition to the closure of irregular and regular channels of migration to the EU, the strategy of migration management and the expansion of the EU borders (and border control) beyond the EU territorial boundaries through initiatives such as the bilateral agreements between the former Libyan regime and Italy, or Tunisia and France, or Morocco and Spain, also affect existing migration routes and systems that are internal to the African continent. This is a side effect rarely considered by EU policy makers but with significant consequences for the livelihoods of local populations. The hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharan migrant workers stranded in Libya that sought refuge across the borders with Egypt and Tunisia during the civil war made the scale of intra-African migration suddenly visible to the global public. As the UNHCR Chief of Mission, Emanuel Gignac, noted in his presentation, non-Libyan nationals made up a large part of the displaced population from Libya. However, the ‘migration crisis’, as described by the IOM representative Mohammed Abdiker, also showed the presence in Libya of a significant population of migrant workers from Asia and whose repatriation posed logistical challenges to respective governments and to the international agencies that assisted them (i.e. IOM and UNHCR). The cooperation between IOM and UNHCR was one of the main themes of the second panel on ‘Migration and institutional responses during and in the transition’ and the speakers from both organisations offered interesting insights on the challenges and strengths of this partnership and of the circumstances that led to it. The framing of the crisis as a ‘migration crisis’ rather than a ‘refugee crisis’ is at the core of the definition of the ‘problem’ that the international community set out to respond to, and implicitly shaped the terms for the ‘solutions’ adopted to address it. The crisis also brought to the fore the complexity of migration routes and flows and challenged existing models of intervention/protection.

Shaden Khallaf presented the case of Egypt and the impact of the fall of Mubarak on asylum and humanitarian protection. She noted that asylum seekers and refugees are suffering from increased insecurity, wide-spread impunity of abuses and rampant xenophobia. The crack-down on civil society and closure of several NGOs, together with a general ‘revolution fatigue’, have caused the shrinking of political spaces for rights-based advocacy and weakened the position of refugees in Egyptian society. Violeta Moreno Lax gave a critical appraisal of the EU’s responses to the Arab Spring. The array of documents, statements, and position papers issued over the last year by EU institutional bodies is remarkable and points to a certain anxiety in Brussels about the so-called ‘biblical exodus’ or ‘human tsunami’ of North Africans towards the northern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. This exodus never happened and, as mentioned earlier, the relationship between the Arab Spring and migration is far more complex and cannot just be interpreted within a narrow EU-centric prism.

The EU’s response to migration induced by the turmoil and instability in North Africa has shown the tension between internal and external dimensions of migration governance. The EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility paper (GAMM) has tried to address this issue – reframing migration in the context of mobility and constructing the EU’s approach around four ‘equally important’ pillars: facilitating regular migration and mobility; ‘preventing and reducing’ irregular migration and trafficking; maximising development impact; promoting international protection and external dimension of asylum policy.

While a step in the right direction, the GAMM still falls short of offering a systemic interpretation of the multiple and interlinked dimensions of migration and remains locked into the false and misleading dichotomy of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migration (even though with a softer tone). The centrality of migration enforcement and control is still paramount and the renewed role of FRONTEX, which saw its operational budget rocketing from €6.3 million in 2005, to nearly €42 million in 2007 and topping €87 million by 2010, encapsulates this priority. The reality of the death at sea of 2,000 migrants in 2011 alone, at a time when the Mediterranean Sea was one of the most militarised areas in the globe, further confirms the distance between EU rhetoric on development and human rights and actual practice. Linked to Moreno Lax’s paper, Polly Pallister Wilkins (SOAS) discussed the spaces and practices of contestation of the EU’s expanding and fluid borders and the possibility for transnational solidarity between Western activists and migrants.

The role of diaspora organisations, transnational networks and civil society was the theme of the third and final panel. In their presentations, Urs Fruehauf (UNHCR) and Jonathan Steel (Guardian) turned the discussion to Syria and the situation on the ground. Drawing on the results of a recently completed survey, Fruehauf discussed the situation of refugees and IDPs in Syria and offered some insight on the pressure they are under in the current political climate. Steel’s presentation centred on Syria’s silent majority and explored the tensions between the narratives produced by the mainstream media and Syrian diaspora and the views of the opposition in the country.

To conclude this short overview of the themes covered at the symposium, I would like to point to two issues/questions that seem to me particularly relevant both in terms of research agenda and potential policy implications:

Is there a link between the closing of irregular, and regular, channels to migration from the Maghreb to the EU, the impoverishment and discontent of North African youth who have lost a promised future and the eruptions of protests on the streets of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco…? How can we research this link? What are its policy implications in the medium and long term from an EU perspective?

Will an anxious EU in search of reassurance for the lost bilateral agreements which had ensured the reduction of ‘undesirable’ migration over the last decade, be able to acknowledge the challenge for newly democratically elected governments to be partner in immigration control and repatriation programmes, or will it rather undermine the credentials of the governments vis-à-vis their voters (brothers, sisters, friends etc. of the migrants) and internationally (maybe with the accusation of being Islamist) in order to force its agenda?

The Arab Spring and Beyond: Human Mobility, Forced Migration and Institutional Responses

The Refugee Studies Centre, International Migration Institute and the Oxford Diasporas Programme are organising a second international symposium on migration and forced migration in North Africa and the Levant on 20 March 2012 with the participation of international scholars, practitioners and policy makers. This second workshop will examine the extent to which the Arab Spring has shifted migration dynamics and migration and refugee governance.

The workshop will address the following questions:

  • How have varying processes of political, economic, and social contestation in North Africa and the Levant affected human mobility?
  • To what extent have events transformed or impacted the institutional behaviour and responses of international organisations and civil society groups working in the field of migration and refugee protection?
  • How have publics and governments in North Africa and the Levant positioned or repositioned themselves in relation to issues of asylum and migration?
  • What role have diasporas and transnational networks played during and after the uprisings?

Download the programme:http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/arab-spring-programme.pdf

 Registration is free. If you wish to attend the event at the Oxford Department of International Development on the 20th March please contact Heidi El-Megrisi rsc-outreach@qeh.ox.ac.uk

Listen to the Arab Spring workshop live online

If you are unable to join us on the 20th you can listen to the Arab Spring and beyond workshop live online by visiting www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/events/arab-spring-workshop, from 11.15AM GMT Tuesday 20 March 2012. Make sure you download the programme (attached) first to check the times for each session as the broadcast will go offline during the breaks.   

Alternatively you can visit the Refugee Studies Centre page on the Mixlr website, mixlr.com/refugee-studies-centre where you can use a Facebook or Twitter profile to join an online discussion. If you’re on Twitter, you can also use the hashtag #rscarabspring.

An online facilitator will track your thoughts, comments and questions throughout the day and feed them into the discussion at the end of each session.

If you’re tuning in online, please be aware that although we will try to keep to the times stated, sessions may overrun resulting in changes to the programme.

 North Africa and displacement – FMR call for articles

In May 2012, to complement the Arab Spring workshop, the Forced Migration Review (FMR) team at the Refugee Studies Centre will publish a special issue of FMR on ‘North Africa and displacement 2011-2012’. Call for articles online at www.fmreview.org/north-africa/ Deadline for submission of articles for FMR is 2nd April 2012. If you are interested in writing, please email the Editors at fmr@qeh.ox.ac.uk as soon as possible.

The Arab Spring and Human Mobility: International Symposyum, University of Oxford, 20 March 2012

Migration in its various forms has been a key part of the popular uprisings that spread across North Africa and the Levant in 2011. The columns of vehicles escaping from cities and villages under siege in Libya, the boats crammed with Tunisians crossing the Mediterranean Sea and landing on the island of Lampedusa, and the numerous Egyptian émigrés and university students returning to Cairo to join the protests in Tahrir Square are a few examples of the ways in which human mobility intersects current events in North Africa and the Levant.

The ‘North Africa in Transition: Mobility, Forced Migration and Humanitarian Crises’ workshop organised by the Refugee Studies Centre (RSC) and the International Migration Institute (IMI) at the University of Oxford on 6 May 2011 offered a platform to begin exploring how these events have impacted existing patterns of mobility in the region and generated new ‘mixed’ migration flows. Panelists observed that the regional crises had prompted some economic migrants to become forced migrants; pushed forced migrants into irregular migration channels; and made multiple migrant groups, including seasonal and long established migrants, ‘involuntarily immobile’. Panelists also observed that apart from large-scale displacement within and from Libya, migration patterns from most other countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt, seemed to have remained remarkably unaffected by the political turmoil, in stark contrast with predictions made by some politicians, journalists and researchers about mass displacement.

To build on this event and take stock of further political and economic developments in the region, the RSC and IMI are organising a second international symposium on migration and forced migration in North Africa and the Levant on 20 March 2012 with the participation of international scholars, practitioners and policy makers. This second workshop will examine the extent to which the Arab Spring has shifted migration dynamics and migration and
refugee governance.

The workshop will address the following questions:

  • How have varying processes of political, economic, and social contestation in North Africa and the Levant affected human mobility?
  • To what extent have events transformed or impacted the institutional behaviour and responses of international organisations and civil society groups working in the field of migration and refugee protection?
  • How have publics and governments in North Africa and the Levant positioned or repositioned themselves in relation to issues of asylum and migration?

The Arab Spring and beyond: human mobility, forced displacement and humanitarian crises

By Nando Sigona

Migration in its various forms has been part of the popular uprisings that have spread across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011. First, the columns of vehicles escaping from cities and villages under siege in Libya came to represent the plight of civilians caught between conflicting parties and played an important role in galvanising Western public opinion in support for the international involvement, both military and humanitarian, in Libya. Second, the isle of Lampedusa and the boats crammed with migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea contributed to
resuscitating the powerful rhetoric of invasion in Europe and have come to represent the ambiguity of Western states’ responses to those fleeing from North Africa — this has included proposals for re-negotiating the Schengen
Agreement and increasing the role of Frontex, the EU agency tasked to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of border security. Finally, the numerous dissidents returning from exile
give an indication of the involvement of diaspora organisations in the uprisings and raise interesting questions on the role they will play in the creation and consolidation of new state institutions.
These few examples only serve to alert us of the broader ramifications of the ways in which human mobility is intersecting current events in North Africa and the Middle East.
The ‘North Africa in Transition: Mobility, Forced Migration and Humanitarian Crises’ workshop organised by the Refugee Studies Centre in association with the International Migration Institute (IMI) on 6 May 2011 offered a platform to begin to explore how these events have affected and transformed existing patterns of mobility in the region and generated new ‘mixed’ migration flows. As a result of the crises, economic migrants have become forced migrants and forced migrants were forced into entering irregular migration channels in the search for survival, while others, including seasonal and long established migrants have become ‘involuntarily immobile’, such as migrant workers stuck inside Libya.
See the workshop report, with podcasts, at www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/ events/northafrica-in-transition
The RSC, IMI and the Oxford Diasporas Programme at the University of Oxford  are planning a follow-up workshop with the involvement of international scholars, practitioners and policy makers on 20th March 2012 which aims to reconsider the relationship between human mobility and the Arab Spring more broadly.